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SOCIAL SECURITY: A PROPOSAL TO
IMPROVE EQUITY AND ADEQUACY FOR
WOMEN
Sara H. Kaltenborn*
INTRODUCTION
The Social Security System has grown since its inception in 1935 to
become "the largest public income maintenance program in the United
States"' and "the government's most successful social program."2 Over
ninety percent of paid employment is covered by Social Security,3 and
its benefits are the most common form of income for people age sixty-
five and older.4 As discussed in another article in this issue,5 a basic
benefit indexed to the cost of living is vitally important to the income
security of retired people.
The Social Security System has been severely criticized for its treat-
ment of women.6 Although women receive better treatment under So-
cial Security than under private pension plans,7 the system's
discriminatory impact on women results in serious problems. This arti-
cle proposes an alternative system for addressing these problems.
* Attorney, Task Force on Sex Discrimination, Civil Rights Division of the United States De-
partment of Justice. B.A., University of Tennessee, 1966; M.S., University of Illinois, 1968;
J.D., Memphis State University School of Law, 1974.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
the position of the United States Department of Justice.
1. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, A REPORT PREPARED FOR
THE SUBCOMM. ON RETIREMENT INCOME OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING, 96TH
CONG., IST SESS., WOMEN AND RETIREMENT INCOME PROGRAMS: CURRENT ISSUES OF EQ-
UITY AND ADEQUACY, 26 (Comm. Print 1979).
2. 1979 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, SOCIAL SECURITY FINANCING AND BENE-
FITS: REPORT OF THE 1979 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY 1 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as REPORT OF THE 1979 ADVISORY COUNCIL].
3. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON PENSION POLICY, AN INTERIM REPORT 4 (May 1980) [hereinafter
cited as INTERIM REPORT].
4. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, SOCIAL SECURITY AND THE CHANG-
ING ROLES OF MEN AND WOMEN 176 (1979) [hereinafter cited as CHANGING ROLES OF MEN
AND WOMEN].
5. Fierst, Women's Retirement Income and the Three-Legged Stool, 8 J. Legis. 263 (1981).
6. See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON WOMEN AND SOCIAL SECURITY, A WORKING PAPER PREPARED
FOR THE SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 94TH CONG., IST SESS., WOMEN AND SOCIAL
SECURITY: ADOPTING TO A NEW ERA (Comm. Print 1975). In 1977 the Congresswomen's
Caucus asked the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Joseph A. Califano, Jr., to
prepare a report on issues involving women and Social Security and proposals for solving the
problems. The report, entitled the REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE TREATMENT OF
WOMEN UNDER SOCIAL SECURITY, was issued in February 1978 and included a discussion
of suggested approaches.
7. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE ON SEX DISCRIMINATION, THE PENSION GAME;
AMERICAN PENSION SYSTEM FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE AVERAGE WOMAN (1979).
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND
SPECIFIC SOCIAL SECURITY PROVISIONS
The Social Security System was designed at a time when most
American families included a breadwinning husband, a homemaking
wife, and dependent children. The system, therefore, provides only
benefits for workers and derivative benefits for dependent wives8 and
children. A major problem is that the protection provided for wives as
homemakers does not equal that provided for workers; homemakers
are without disability insurance or benefits for their survivors in the
event of their death.
A second major problem involves the treatment of the increasing
number of women who work in covered employment.' 0 At retirement
age, these women are generally eligible for benefits both as dependent
8. Treatment of Women under Social Security Hearings Before the Task Force on Social Secur-
ity and Women of the Subcommn on Retirement Income and Employment and Select Comm. on
Aging, House ofRepresentatives, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1980) (Appendix 111, containing U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, SOCIAL SECURITY AND THE CHANGING
ROLES OF MEN AND WOMEN 9-11 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1980 Hearings]. The Social
Security Act has been amended over the years to add generally equivalent benefits for hus-
bands. Some gender-based distinctions have been held to be unconstitutional. E.g.,
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (where the Court held that a survivor's benefit
provision requiring widowers, but not widows of insured workers, to prove actual depen-
dency in order to qualify for benefits offered female wage earners less protection for their
surviving spouses than that provided male employees); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S.
636 (1975) (where the Court struck down a provision which granted survivor's benefits to
mothers but not to fathers of minor children of deceased workers); but see Califano v. Web-
ster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam) (where the failure by Congress to make a 1972 exten-
sion to men of a favorable computation change, previously applied only to women,
retroactive was held not to constitute unconstitutional discrimination on the basis of sex).
See generally Martin, Social Security Benefitsfor Spouses, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 789 (1978).
9. Survivor's benefits are provided only if the decedent was fully or currently insured. 42
U.S.C. § 402(d) (1976) (child's benefits); 42 U.S.C. § 402(e) (1976 & Supp. 11 1978) (widow's
benefits); 42 U.S.C. § 402(f) (1976 & Supp. 11 1978) (widower's benefits); 42 U.S.C. § 402(g)
(1976 & Supp. 11 1978) (mother's benefits). An individual is "fully insured" if he or she has
coverage for 10 years (40 quarters) or coverage for one-fourth of the years between the year
in which he or she attained age 21 and the year of death, but not less than six quarters of
coverage. 42 U.S.C. § 414(a) (1976). An individual is currently insured for survivor's bene-
fits if he or she had at least six quarters of coverage in the 13 quarters immediately preceding
his or her death. 42 U.S.C. § 414(b)(1) (1976). Fulltime homemakers are therefore unlikely
to be insured for survivor's benefits.
In order to be ensured of disability benefits an individual must be fully insured and must
meet an additional recency of work requirement. An individual over age 31 must have 20
quarters (five years) of coverage in the 40 quarters (10 years) immediately preceding the
onset of the disability. An individual under 31 must have coverage for one-half of the
quarters between the quarter he or she attained the age of 21 and the quarter in which he or
e became disabled, but not less than six quarters of coverage 42 U.S.C. § 423(c)(1) (1976).
Women who drop out of the labor force to become homemakers lose any disability coverage
as homemakers after five years or less, and if they re-enter the labor force, they must work
for five years to regain coverage.
10. The number of women in the labor force is increasing dramatically. PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY
COMMITTEE FOR WOMEN, VOICES FOR WOMEN: 1980 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S ADVI-
SORY COMMITTFEE FOR WOMEN 131 (1980) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY
COMMITTEE]. In addition, the original Social Security Act covered employees in commerce
and industry. Today, as a result of legislative reforms, most people in the United States who
work for a living are covered. Exceptions include "permanent civilian employees of the
Federal government, employees of state and local governments which have not elected cov-
erage for their employees, and employees of nonprofit organizations which have not waived
their exempt status in order to provide Social Security coverage for their employees." NA-
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wives and as workers in their own right. Entitlement to more than one
benefit is called "dual entitlement." The amount that dually entitled
persons actually receive, however, is limited to the higher of the two
benefits for which they are eligible." Because the benefits cannot be
added together, their benefits as workers duplicate, rather than supple-
ment, their benefits as spouses.
To illustrate this problem, it is useful to compare the treatment af-
forded the following hypothetical couples. Suppose that a husband re-
tired in 1980 with average indexed monthly earnings (AIME) 12 of
$1,200. Because his wife has never worked in covered employment, her
AIME is zero. His benefit as a retired worker amounts to $492, while
she, as a dependent wife, is entitled to a benefit equal to fifty percent of
her husband's benefit or $246.13 The couple, therefore, is entitled to a
combined benefit totalling $738. Compare that couple to a second
couple that also has a combined AIME of $1,200. Suppose, however,
that this husband's AIME is $900 and his wife's AIME is $300. The
husband's benefit at age sixty-five is $401, while his wife is eligible for
either a wife's benefit of $200 or a worker's benefit of $209 based on her
own AIME. Since the wife's benefit as a worker is greater than her
benefit as a wife, the couple's total benefit would be the sum of the two
workers' benefits or $610. This total is $128 less than that of the first
couple.
The discrepancy in benefits between couples with one earner and
couples with the same total earnings divided between two earners is
even greater with regard to survivor's benefits. If the husband in the
first hypothetical dies, his wife will be entitled to a widow's benefit
equal to his worker's benefit, $492. 4 Although the wife in the second
couple would also be entitled to a widow's benefit upon the death of
her husband, her benefit would be only $401, $91 less than that of the
first widow.
A third problem with the current Social Security System lies in its
treatment of divorced persons. A woman whose marriage to a covered
worker ends in divorce after ten years or more is treated as if she were
still married for purposes of qualifying for wife's and widow's bene-
TIONAL COMM'N ON SOCIAL SECURITY, SOCIAL SECURITY IN AMERICA'S FUTURE: FINAL
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON SOCIAL SECURITY 168 (1981).
11. The Social Security Act provides that an individual entitled to two or more benefits can
receive no more than the highest single benefit. 42 U.S.C. § 402(k) (1976). An individual
entitled as a worker and as a spouse receives the worker's benefit. If the spouse's benefit is
higher than the worker's benefit, the worker's benefit is subtracted from the spouse's benefit,
and the difference is paid as a supplement to the worker's benefit.
12. Average indexed monthly earnings or AIME for a retired worker are the average covered
earnings of the worker, indexed to wages, over his or her computation period, which includes
the years between 1950 (or the year that the worker reached age 21, whichever is later) and
the year that the worker reached 62, less five "drop-out" years. The computation period will
be 35 for workers born after 1939. 42 U.S.C. § 415 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(2) (Supp. 11 1978).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 402(e)(2)(A) (Supp. 11 1978).
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fits.15 As long as her former husband is retired, she will be eligible for a
wife's benefit equal to fifty percent of his benefit, based on his lifetime
earnings record at age sixty-five.' 6 She is not entitled to any benefit
before he retires, and her benefit will be actuarially reduced if she
claims it before age sixty-five.' 7 The fifty percent wife's benefit is
designed to be supplemental in nature. It supplements the benefit of a
retired worker in recognition of the fact that the benefit must support
two people.' 8 A fifty percent wife's benefit is insufficient to support a
single individual living alone. Moreover, the requirement that the for-
mer husband be retired before the wife collects' creates hardships for
divorced women whose husbands are younger than they and/or choose
to continue working for an extended period of time. One positive pro-
vision in the current Social Security System is that the divorced wife's
position improves when her former husband dies. At that time, her
benefit as a surviving divorced wife is the same as a widow's benefit.2 °
PROPOSED SOLUTION: EARNINGS SHARING
One proposal to solve the problems in the current system advocates
earnings sharing, a method of splitting earnings credits between hus-
band and wife for the years of the marriage. An earnings sharing plan
was one of the comprehensive options developed by the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare in its report, "Social Security and the
Changing Roles of Men and Women."'2 ' The earnings sharing ap-
proach has also been endorsed, in part, by the 1979 Advisory Council
on Social Security 22 and by the President's Commission on Pension
15. 42 U.S.C. § 402(b) (wife's benefits) & (e) (widow's benefits) (Supp. 11 1978); see 1980 Hear-
ings, supra note 8, at 25 (Appendix III, containing U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND
WELFARE, SOCIAL SECURITY AND THE CHANGING ROLES OF MEN AND WOMEN (1979).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(2) (Supp. I 1978).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 402(q) (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
18. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 3, at 27-30.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 402(e)(1) (1976).
21. CHANGING ROLES OF MEN AND WOMEN supra note 4.
In 1976 a Task Force on Sex Discrimination was established in the Civil Rights Division
of the Department of Justice to eliminate sex discrimination from the laws and practices of
the federal government. The Task Force focused on the Social Security System and in 1977
developed an earnings sharing plan designed to eliminate the disparate impact of the Social
Security System on women. The earnings sharing plan, set out in a draft report, was never
finalized but was referred to in congressional testimony concerning sex discrimination inher-
ent in the Social Security System. President Carter's Social Security Proposals: Hearings
Before the Subcomm on Social Security of the House Com. on Ways and Means, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 567 (1977) (statement of Donald Fraser) [hereinafter cited as President
Carter's Social Security Proposals]. The draft was later published as Appendix III to 1980
Hearings, supra note 8.
As a result, Congress, in the 1977 Social Security Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-216,
91 Stat. 1548 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 902 (Supp. 1 1977), directed the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare (HEW) to consult with the Task Force in a study of ways to improve
the treatment of women under social security laws. The report, SOCIAL SECURITY AND THE
CHANGING ROLES OF MEN AND WOMEN, was issued in February 1979. It was also pub-
lished as Appendix III to 1980 Hearings, supra note 8. It included an alternative earnings
sharing plan.
22. REPORT OF THE 1979 ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 2.
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Policy,23 although both groups recognize that some problems with
earnings sharing have yet to be resolved. Finally, the President's Advi-
sory Committee on Women endorsed the approach in 1980.24
The philosophy behind earnings sharing is that marriage is an eco-
nomic partnership and that assets accumulated during marriage, in-
cluding a social security earnings record, should be shared equally
between spouses, regardless of how they chose to allocate homemaking
and breadwinning responsibilities. 25 It is presumed that retirement in-
come should be based on an individual's constructive activities during
his or her lifetime. For this purpose, homemaking and paid participa-
tion in the labor force should each constitute constructive activity.
In its simplest form, earnings sharing would credit each spouse with
fifty percent of a couple's total covered earnings for each year of the
marriage. Each spouse's social security benefit would then be based on
his or her own earnings record which would include all covered earn-
ings from years that the individual was not married and shared earn-
ings from years that the individual was married.26
Pure earnings sharing presents two fundamental problems. First, it
may produce inappropriate results when only one spouse is entitled to
benefits as a result of disability, retirement, or the death of the other
spouse.27 Second, it is intended to correct inequities in the current sys-
tem; that is, it is based on a perception that under the current system
some people unfairly receive more money than others. Thus, if it is to
be implemented without substantially increasing costs (by "equalizing
up" in all cases), it will necessarily decrease benefits for some classes of
beneficiaries. Although it is generally accepted that a transitional plan
is needed to protect those who will retire in the near future, a fully
developed transitional plan has not yet been proposed.
Modified Earnings Sharing
The following is a description and critique of a modified earnings
sharing plan. It includes a transitional plan that addresses both the
problems in the treatment of women under the current system and the
problems raised by pure earnings sharing.
23. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 3.
24. PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 10, at 131. Specifically, the Committee rec-
ommended changing the Social Security Act "to account for homemaker contributions
through a system of 'earnings sharing.'" Id.
25. Social Security Inequities Against Women: Hearings Before the Subcommr on Retirement In-
come and Employment of the House Select Comm. on Aging, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 28-29
(1975) (statement of Arvonne Fraser); Future Directions in Social Security. Hearings Before
the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1756 (1975) (statement of Arvonne
Fraser); President Carter's Social Security Proposals, supra note 21, at 567.
26. 1980 Hearings, supra note 8, at 14 (Appendix II, containing REPORT OF THE 1979 ADVISORY
COUNCIL, supra note 2). As a practical matter, earnings credits may be split or shared retro-
actively when a specified event, such as divorce, disability, or retirement, occurs.
27. Id. at 15.
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Share Earnings Only at Divorce. All benefits under this proposal
are based on the individual's record, as altered by any earnings sharing
or inheritance that has occurred. This proposal would increase benefits
for homemakers and lower-earning spouses and decrease benefits for
higher-earning divorced persons. As a result, it would distribute the
economic burdens of divorce more equally between spouses and would
serve as a disincentive to divorce for higher earners.
All benefits after a divorce would be based on shared earnings.
This would produce a trade-off between increased protection in some
situations and reduced protection in others. For example, if a one-
earner couple with children divorces and the higher-earner is subse-
quently disabled, disability benefits for the worker and the children
would be reduced by earnings sharing. On the other hand, if the home-
maker is disabled within five years of a divorce, current law provides
no disability benefits for either the homemaker or the children.2" Be-
cause the homemaker is more likely than the worker to receive custody
of the children,29 the disability of a divorced homemaker is likely to
impose a heavier economic burden on the family than the disability of
the worker. To ameliorate this situation, earnings sharing would pro-
vide increased disability protection for divorced homemakers.
A "divorce incentive" may be said to exist whenever similarly situ-
ated individuals or couples would receive more favorable treatment if
they were divorced than if they were married. However, a married
homemaker supported by a working spouse does not encounter, as a
result of a disability, the financial hardship faced by a divorced home-
maker. This is especially true since a divorced homemaker probably is
not receiving and cannot expect to receive support from his or her for-
mer spouse. 0 The significant difference in the needs of married and
divorced homemakers justifies differential treatment.
If divorce occurs before the onset of the disability, there is, of
course, no divorce incentive. Determining the time of onset, however,
may be difficult. In addition, there exists the danger that divorce may
be prompted by the expectation that a progressive disease will result in
a disability. It is, therefore, impractical to limit coverage to disabilities
occurring after a divorce. A disabled homemaker who loses his or her
source of support through divorce logically should receive the same
protection as a homemaker who is disabled after a divorce.
28. See note 9 5upra.
29. In 1978, 91% of children under 18 living with a divorced parent with no spouse present lived
with their mothers. Calculated from U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: DIVORCE, CHILD CUSTODY, AND CHILD SUPPORT, Special
Studies Ser. P-23, No. 84., Table 6, at I (1979).
30. In 1979, approximately "fourtet- percent of the 14.3 million ever-divorced or separated wo-
men were awarded or had an agreement to receive alimony or maintenance payments." U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: CHILD
SUPPORT AND ALIMONY: 1978, Advance Rep., Special Studies Ser. P-23, No. 106, at i
(1980). Of the almost 760,000 women supposed to receive alimony payments in 1978, about
two-thirds actually received them. ld.
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There is a fear that providing disability insurance only for divorced
homemakers would either lead to sham divorces or encourage real di-
vorces when the married homemaker is disabled. Absent more definite
evidence that the fear is justified, this fear should not be used to justify
denial of disability insurance to divorced homemakers who need it.
Sham divorces could be discouraged by providing appropriate, but lim-
ited, disability protection for married homemakers. If necessary, ap-
propriate rules could be established to disregard sham divorces (for
example, where the couple continues to live together).
Inheritance of Earnings. Surviving spouses and surviving divorced
spouses inherit credits earned during the marriage. All benefits are
based on the individual's record as altered by any inheritance or shar-
ing that has occurred. Under current law, the surviving spouse or the
surviving divorced wife of a worker is eligible for widow(er)'s benefits
equal to the benefit that the worker received or would have received as
a retired worker.31 If the spouse is also entitled to a benefit as a retired
worker, his or her benefit is the greater of the two amounts.
Under this modified earnings sharing program, inheritance of earn-
ings credits would replace benefits for surviving spouses and surviving
divorced wives. Survivors of lifelong marriages would be entitled to
benefits, as workers, based upon inherited earnings at least equal to
those provided under current law.32 These benefits would be increased
by any of the survivor's own earnings. The proposal would increase,
therefore, benefits for survivors of two-earner couples.33 Benefits could
be decreased slightly for surviving homemakers, if the duration of the
marriage was shorter than the benefit computation period and the
homemaker earned less than the deceased spouse in the years before
and after the marriage. This result is consistent with the principle that
benefits should be based on an individual's own lifetime record, includ-
ing earnings of either spouse during a marriage. Inheritance of earn-
ings credits would also improve protection for homemakers because
widowed homemakers would be entitled to disability coverage based
on inherited earnings.
Benefitsfor Retired Couples. Currently, a worker aged sixty-two or
older is eligible for retirement benefits.34 The individual's Primary In-
surance Amount (PIA),as which is the amount payable if the worker
31. 42 U.S.C. § 402(e) (widow's benefits and surviving divorced wife's benefits) & (f) (widower's
benefits) (1976 & Supp. 11 1978). The benefit is subject to actuarial reduction if taken before
age 65. 42 U.S.C. § 402(q) (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
32. Id.
33. See 1980 Hearings, supra note 8, at 22 (Appendix II, containing REPORT OF THE 1979 ADVI-
SORY COUNCIL, supra note 2).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 402(a)(2) (1976). Workers must be "fully insured individuals," as defined by 42
U.S.C. § 414(a) (1976).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 415 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
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retires at age sixty-five, is related to the worker's AIME.36 The PIA is
determined by the following formula:
90% of the first $194,
plus 32% of AIME between $194 and $1,171,
plus 15% of AIME in excess of $1,171.1'
The dollar amounts in the formula ($194 and $1,171) may be called
"bend points" because they are the amounts at which the ratio of PIA
to AIME changes. The bend points shown were used in the 1980 bene-
fit formula and are indexed to wages.3 ' The ratios of PIA to AIME
may be called multipliers, and they do not change over time.
If a retired worker is married and both spouses claim benefits at age
sixty-five, the "spouse's benefit" is equal to 50% of the "worker's bene-
fit."' 3 9 Therefore, the couple's benefit is 150% of the worker's benefit, as
determined under the formula above. Multiplying the worker's PIA by
150% has the same effect as multiplying the multipliers in the benefit
formula by 150%. The benefit of a couple receiving one "worker's ben-
efit" and one "spouse's benefit," therefore, is the same as if the benefit
were computed according to the following formula, using the AIME of
the higher earning spouse:
135% of the first $194,
plus 48% of AIME between $194 and $1,171,
plus 22.5% of AIME in excess of $1,171.
When both spouses are entitled to benefits as workers, the benefit
formula is applied to each spouse's AIME individually in order to de-
termine their individual PIA's. As a result, benefits for couples with
two earners vary depending on the distribution of earnings between the
spouses and on the relationship of each spouse's AIME to the formula's
bend points. For an extreme example, consider couple A, where the
husband's AIME is $277 and the wife's AIME is $111. The husband's
PIA is
90% of the first $194 = $175,
plus 32% of $277-$194 = 27
$202.
The wife's PIA is 90% of $111 or $100. The couple's benefit is the sum
of their individual benefits or $302.
Compare couple B, where combined AIME's are the same as that of
couple A ($388), but both spouses have equal AIME's of $194. Each
spouse's benefit is 90% of $194 or $175. Thus, the couple's benefit is
2 x 90% of $194 or $350.
36. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a) (Supp. IT 1978). These dollar amounts are indexed to wages. The
amounts shown were used in 1980. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,956-58 (1979). The Secretary shall pub-
lish in the Federal Register on or before November of each year the formula for computing
benefits and for adjusting wages and self-employment income. Id.
38. Id.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(2) (Supp. 11 1978).
19811
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The difference in benefits between couple A and couple B is caused
by the fact that husband A's AIME exceeds the first bend point in the
formula by $83; therefore, in determining his PIA, the excess is multi-
plied by 32% rather than by 90%. In general, then, when the AIME's of
a husband and wife are unequal, there is a possibility that transferring
some of the earnings from the higher earner to the lower earner could
result in increased benefits for the couple. This occurs when the trans-
ferred earnings fall into a bracket with a higher multiplier.
The inequality of benefits for two-earner couples with different dis-
tributions of earnings could be remedied by treating all two-earner
couples as though the earnings were equally distributed between the
spouses. This has the effect of doubling the bend points based on the
combined AIME as follows:
90% of the first $388,
plus 32% of combined AIME between $388 and $2,342,
plus 15% of combined AIME in excess of $2,342. 4
Retired couples would be permitted to base their benefits on the
formula producing the greatest total benefit. As a result, all two-earner
couples would receive benefits at least equal to those of other couples
with the same total earnings divided equally between the spouses.
Under this formula, one-earner couples, as well as some two-earner
couples with one AIME much higher than the other, would receive
higher benefits under the formula equivalent to the current law
worker's benefit plus the spouse's benefit. This formula would be
phased out gradually.4'
Disability and Survivors' Benefitsfor Married Individuals. The disa-
bility of a married homemaker does not produce a loss of cash income
to a family. It does, however, result in a loss of homemaking and child-
care services and in a significant increase in necessary household ex-
penditures. It is also likely to result in significant medical costs. For
this reason, married homemakers should be permitted to use their
spouses' earnings records to establish eligibility for medicare benefits
on the same basis as disabled workers. In addition, flat-rate benefits for
young children of disabled or deceased homemakers should be pro-
vided to enable families to meet the child-care costs incurred as a result
of the homemaker's disability or death. Finally, homemakers who
reach retirement age before their working spouses should be allowed to
use their spouses' records to establish eligibility for medicare and a flat-
rate benefit for any young children.
TRANSITION: SURVIVING SPOUSES AND DIVORCED SPOUSES
Earnings sharing ensures that retirement benefits are based upon
40. See note 37 supra.
41. See text accompanying note 44 infra.
[Vol. 8:250
Social Security
credits earned during all years when the individual either worked in
covered employment or was married to, and presumably kept house
for, someone who worked in covered employment. Reductions in ben-
efits for years when the individual neither worked nor was married to a
worker are intended as a consequence of the system, as are reductions
in benefits for divorced higher-earners.
Earnings sharing and inheritance of earnings credits would ulti-
mately replace the current law's benefits for divorced wives, surviving
divorced wives, and widow(er)s.4 z To ensure that benefits are not lost
for years of marriage when earnings were not subject to sharing or in-
heritance, current benefits should be retained for all marriages begin-
ning before institution of these provisions. This retention of benefits
provided under current law produces acceptable results in all but two
cases. First, widows of late marriages of short duration could not com-
bine inherited credits with "dependent" spouse benefits based upon an
earlier marriage. They would in effect be dually entitled.
Widow(er)'s benefits under current law are based on the worker's
lifetime earnings record.43 Logically, then, there is no reason for a
widow to receive benefits based upon a deceased husband's earnings in
years when they were not married. Widow's benefits should be re-
placed, therefore, by inherited earnings which, in turn, should be com-
bined with earnings acquired through covered employment or through
other marriages. This proposal should be implemented in a manner
that does not disrupt current expectations. Current benefits would be
retained as an alternative for marriages that begin up to five years after
implementation of the proposed system.
Second, divorced wives' and surviving divorced wives' benefits pro-
vided under current law would be reduced as a result of any reduction
in the former spouses' earnings records resulting from divorce. This
reduction would be greatest for those wives who were married longest.
The worst case would be a homemaker who was married through-
out the computation period and for whom implementation occurred in
the middle of the computation period. Earnings would be shared at the
time of divorce for years after implementation; therefore, the home-
maker would be entitled to benefits as a worker based upon those
shared earnings. Because the marriage began before implementation,
she would also be entitled to benefits as a divorced wife when the for-
mer husband retired. Those benefits, however, would be reduced by
sharing based upon the former husband's record. Her benefit as a di-
vorced wife would be computed as fifty percent of her former hus-
band's benefit, based upon his reduced record. Unless the former wife
was entitled to enough years of shared earnings to produce a worker's
42. Current benefits are codified at 42 U.S.C. § 402(b) (divorced wife's benefits) & (e) (widow's
benefits and surviving, divorced wife's benefits), and (f) (widower's benefits) (1976 & Supp.
11 1978). See note I I supra and accompanying text.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 402(e)(2)(A) (Supp. 11 1978).
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benefit equal to that she would have received as a divorced wife under
current law, she may be better off with no earnings sharing.
To avoid this problem created by marriages that begin before im-
plementation and end in divorce after implementation, a partially ret-
roactive sharing could be provided. The lower-earning spouse could
receive credits equal to one-half of the couple's combined earnings for
all years of the marriage. Unfairness to the higher earner might result
if his or her earnings record were decreased for years before implemen-
tation of the proposed system. The higher earner's record, therefore,
could be reduced by sharing only for those years after implementation.
Sharing earnings at divorce reduces the higher-earning spouse's
earnings record and, therefore, reduces benefits for divorced wives and
surviving divorced wives based on that record. Ultimately, divorced
wives will receive fairer and more adequate protection through earn-
ings credits acquired through divorce and inheritance. In the transi-
tional period, however, benefits for divorced wives and surviving
divorced wives of marriages that began before implementation should
be retained.
TRANSITION: RETIRED COUPLES
As previously discussed, the benefit formula produces lower bene-
fits for two-earner couples with different distributions of earnings be-
tween the spouses. An alternative benefit formula that treats all two-
earner couples as though each spouse had equal earnings would correct
this inequality. A problem remains, however, because provision of
"dependent" spouse's benefits allows couples in which one spouse con-
tributed all or most of the earnings to receive higher benefits than two-
earner couples receive under current law. The proposal would elimi-
nate this problem over a twenty-five year period by changing the one-
earner benefit formula to equal the two-earner benefit formula." Use
of the one-earner formula will decline gradually, as more couples are
able to obtain higher benefits by using the two-earner formula based on
their combined AIME's. Calculated at five-year intervals, the formula
would be adjusted as follows:
Years after
Implementation Adjusted Formula
0-5 135% of the first $194,
plus 48% of AIME between $194 and $1,171,
plus 22.5% of AIME in excess of $1,171.
10 121.5% of the first $233,
plus 43.2% of AIME between $233 and $1,405,
plus 20.25% of AIME in excess of $1,405.
44. See text accompanying notes 39-40 supra.
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15 109.35% of the first $280,
plus 38.88% of AIME between $280 and $1,686,
plus 18.23% of AIME in excess of $1,686.
20 98.42% of the first $336,
plus 35% of AIME between $336 and $2,023,
plus 16.4% of AIME in excess of $2,023.
25 90% of the first $388,
plus 32% of AIME between $388 and $2,342,
plus 15% of AIME in excess of $2,342.
COSTS
Although an estimate of the cost of this proposal is beyond the
scope of this paper, acknowledgement of its cost implications is neces-
sary. Ultimately, elimination of higher benefits for one-earner families
will reduce costs, while addition of protection for homemakers will in-
crease costs. The balance of cost increases and decreases will, of
course, have to be calculated before any proposal is adopted.
The transitional period during which protection is improved and
higher benefits under current law remain available, will be more expen-
sive than the ultimate system. The "financial crisis" of the Social Se-
curity System is currently a matter of great public interest, but the
short-range difficulties of the System are far less serious than its long-
range funding problems. The Trustees of the Social Security trust
funds project that under current law the income of the funds over the
next twenty-five years will slightly exceed expenditures.45 An actual
crisis is expected about thirty years from now in 2010, when the post-
war baby-boom generation begins to reach retirement age.46 Because
Social Security is a pay-as-you-go system (that is, taxes paid by today's
workers are used to pay benefits to today's retirees), its cost depends
upon the ratio of retirees to workers, the "dependency ratio." In 1930
that ratio was 9.1%. By 1980 it had risen to 18.4%. It is expected to
increase rapidly beginning in 2010 and reach 31.8% in 2030. 47 Thus,
despite valid concern about the immediate financial position of the So-
cial Security System, attention should be focused on the potentially
more serious, long-range problems. If the system's provisions regard-
ing women are reformed in the near future, the costly transitional
phase can be completed before 2010.
45. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION & HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION, SUM-
MARY OF THE 1980 REPORTS ON THE SOCIAL SECURITY TRUST FUNDS 11-14 (June 19,1980).
46. INTERIM REPORT, sura note 3, at 41-44.
47. PRESIDENT'S COMM N ON PENSION, DEMOGRAPHIC SHIFTS AND PROJECTIONS: THE IMPLI-
CATIONS FOR PENSION SYSTEM (WORKING PAPERS) 28 (1980). "Dependency ratios" should
be used with caution. The figures shown, for example, include only persons over age 65 as
"dependents." When persons under age 18 are included, changes in the dependency ratio
are less significant. Id.
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CONCLUSION
There are two hard facts concerning the equality of men and wo-
men under the Social Security System.48 First, one-earner couples and
their survivors generally receive higher benefits than two-earner
couples and their survivors. It is not possible to raise benefits for two-
earner couples to levels equivalent to those for one-earner couples
without substantially increasing costs. Reduction of benefits for one-
earner couples to the level of those received by two-earner couples,
however, may be politically infeasible. Second, the disability or death
of a homemaker does not result in a loss of income to the family. As a
result, provision of full disability and survivor benefits for homemakers
would produce a substantial net increase in the incomes of their fami-
lies for which a sufficient justification may not exist. The services of a
homemaker are a valuable contribution to a family, but they are diffi-
cult to value. Furthermore, they cannot be fully replaced by purchased
services. Full cash disability and survivors' benefits for homemakers,
therefore, may be inappropriate.
This earnings sharing proposal attempts to address these problems
by trading gradual reductions in benefits for one-earner families for
appropriate improvements in protection for homemakers. The result, it
is hoped, will be a benefit structure in which no class of beneficiaries
suffers a net loss in protection, and the actual needs of individuals and
families are met more appropriately than under the current benefit
structure.
48. The Social Security System is highly complex, and any proposed modification as broad in
concept as earnings sharing inevitably raises difficult technical problems. The Social Secur-
ity Administration's working paper on the interim recommendations of the 1979 Advisory
Council on Social Security discusses a number of such problems and possible solutions to
them. It is clear that much additional work must be done on the details of the proposed
system before it can be implemented, but the technical problems can be resolved adequately
when agreement is reached on the broad outline of the reforms required. SOCIAL SECURITY
-ADMINISTRATION, DEVELOPMENT OF THE ADVISORY COUNCIL'S INTERIM RECOMMENDA-
TIONS ON THE TREATMENT OF WOMEN (Sept. 12, 1980).
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